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INTRODUCTION
The law review editor's suggestion was inviting: "How about an
essay on the most important development in your field in the last fifty
years?"
This sounded pretty easy,1 at first. It should have been obvious to
t Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Editor-in-Chief, Syracuse
Law Review, 1976-1977. The author wishes to thank David Baay, SMU class of 2000, who
provided valuable research assistance for this article.
1. It sounded easy in part because a 50-year review in the field of Health Law would
involve only about 30 years' worth of developments in this young area of legal
specialization. One of the first signs that health law had established a professional identity
for itself was the creation of professional associations for health lawyers. The American
Academy of Hospital Attorneys was created in 1968 "as a personal membership group of
the American Hospital Association to serve the needs of attorneys representing hospitals and
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me-someone who freezes whenever he is asked to name his favorite
poet,2 Motown hit,3 or dessert4-that this assignment might be a lot of
things, but "easy" wouldn't be one of them.
Part of the difficulty stems from the diverse nature of the field of
"health law" itself. For example, I might have chosen the modem judicial
restatement of the law of informed consent,' the first "right to die" case,6
health systems," followed by the founding of the National Health Lawyers Association in
1971. See American Health Lawyers Ass'n, History: About Health Lawyers (updated Aug.
22, 2000) <http://www.healthlawyers.org/abouthistory.htrn>. The two organizations
merged in 1997 to form a 10,000-member organization that eventually became known as the
American Health Lawyers Association. Id.
Health law courses were presumably being taught in American law schools in the late 1970s
and 1980s, but the phrase "Health Law" did not see its way into a casebook title until 1987.
See BARRY R. FuRROW, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIAL & PROBLEMS (1987). The casebook that had previously
defined the field of Law & Medicine for a generation was LAW, MEDICINE & FORENSIC
SCIENCE by one of the pioneers in this field, Professor William J. Curran (joined later by
Professor E. Donald Shapiro). The third edition (published in 1982) retained the book's
focus on medical liability issues, although it included "cursory sections on reimbursement
issues and health planning," Clifford D. Stromberg, Health Law Comes ofAge: Economics
and Ethics in a Changing Industry, 92 YALE L.J. 203, 217 (1982), a brief section on
antitrust, id. at 214, and a single chapter on regulation in the health care industry, id at 209.
After the addition of Professor Mark Hall as a co-editor on the fourth edition, the Curran
casebook moved even more strongly toward coverage of health-law topics. The
transformation of the Curran casebook into a health-law text is now complete. See WILLIAM
J. CURRAN, MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAvID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE
LAW & ETHiCS (5th ed. 1998).
2. Another attractive feature of this assignment was that the editors asked for an
"essay," not an "article." In the parlance of the trade, this means the piece could be shorter
than a "real" law review article; could be more casually documented; could include
contractions and other, y'know, verbal tics; and could eschew lengthy textual footnotes (but
see supra note 1). So if you're reading this footnote because you were expecting a
copiously researched and learned discussion of the history of poetry in the English language
from the 12th through the 20th centuries, see instead MICHAEL SCHMIDT, LIVES OF THE
POETS (1999).
3. Cf supra note 2. See also SUZANNE E. SMITH, DANCING IN THE STREET: MOTOWN
AND THE CULTrRAL POLICs OF DETROIT (2000); EVERY GREAT MOTOWN SONG: VOL. 1,
1960s (Motown Records 1988), VOL. 2, 1970s (Motown Records 1989).
4. Cf supra note 3. See also HOUSTON JUNIOR LEAGUE COOKBOOK 372 (1992) (recipe
for creme brulde).
5. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Judge Spottswood Robinson's scholarly opinion is the intellectual forerunner of the
patients' rights movement and appears in nearly every health law casebook and most first-
year torts casebooks, as well. I could list the titles of all those books, of course, but cf
supra note 2.
6. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The
implications of the "right to die" movement, which arguably received its greatest boost
from the Quinlan case, are still being worked out in the arena of physician-assisted suicide,
which has generated one state statute that legalizes the practice, see OR. REV. STAT. §§
127.800-.897 (1997) (Oregon Death With Dignity Act); significant litigation in the United
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the decision by the Internal Revenue Service to water down its "charity-
care" requirement for hospitals that seek tax-exempt status, 7 the extension
of the federal antitrust laws to the "learned professions"8I (including
physicians), or even the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.1 Each of these developments could be said to have
profoundly changed the law and also to have altered the cultural landscape
of health care beyond the sphere in which those events occurred. At the
States Supreme Court, see Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), and Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); and a nasty fight among Congress, the Clinton
Administration's Justice Department, and (in absentia) the state of Oregon, see Pain Relief
Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong., and Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Chafes
at Measure to Stop Assisted Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at Al. One version of the
Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 passed the House on October 27, 1999, 145 Cong Rec.
H10,868-10,903 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (debate and roll call vote on H.R. 2260 as
amended), and a quite different version was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on Apr. 27, 2000, see Stephen Power, Senate panel OKs anti-suicide bill, DES MOINES REG.,
Apr. 28, 2000, at 4. Meanwhile, Maine has a physician-assisted suicide proposal on the
November 2000 ballot. At the time this article was being prepared for publication, voters
appeared evenly split over the measure. See Susan Young, Latest poll gives Gore lead over
Bush in Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 26, 2000, at BI (describing poll that showed
support and opposition both at 43.5% and undecideds at 13%).
7. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This decision dropped the requirement of
charity care that was announced in Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (requiring a tax-
exempt hospital to be operated "to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay
for the services rendered"). Revenue Ruling 69-545 also spawned one of the Supreme
Court's major "standing" decisions. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (introducing the requirements of"traceability" and "redressability").
8. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Although it can debated
whether the antitrust laws have been over- or under-enforced in the health care industry,
there can be little doubt that the regulatory impact of the laws in the post-Goldfarb era has
been great. That impact is well documented in CLARK C. HAvIGHURST, JAMES F.
BLUMSTEIN & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY 499-590 (2d ed. 1998).
See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE (Aug. 1996), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0000.htm>.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III). Even though ERISA isn't technically
a health care law at all, its impact on health law has been profound. For example, most of
the large employers in the country sponsor self-insured health care benefit plans primarily
for one reason-thanks to ERISA, the benefit plans can avoid the various states' mandated-
benefits laws, state insurance regulations, and liability for coverage decisions. See CLARK
C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & TROYEN BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
219-20 (2nd ed. 1998), quoting Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, HEALTH AFF.
171, 172 (March/April 1997). Of course, the law in this area is not nearly as clear-cut and
settled as the previous sentences would imply. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct.
2143 (2000) (exploring some of the complexities of such statutory terms as "plan" and
"fiduciary," parsing the "practically inextricable" concepts of "treatment decision" and
"eligibility decision," testing the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit HMOs, and
considering (without resolving) some of the implications of ERISA preemption for state
medical malpractice claims against HMOs).
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same time, however, each of these developments was a "health law"
development only because health law is a hybrid discipline that has
absorbed large amounts of tort law, constitutional law, tax law, and
antitrust law, to name just a few influences.
My choice for the single most significant development in this field
has, like the examples above, profoundly changed the body of health law.
And, like the other examples, it has altered the cultural landscape in which
health care is delivered. But it has also changed the politics of health care,
the financing of health care, and the availability and quality of health care
in this country. It has all but defined a unique body of law that is readily
identifiable as "health law," as opposed to tort, antitrust, or tax law as
applied to providers of health care goods and services, while at the same
time producing spillover effects in many of the related areas of law that
contribute to health law as a specialty. If these effects are accepted as the
criteria by which my choice is to be made, I can truthfully think of only one
candidate: the passage of the Medicare law in 1965.0
The Medicare program began with the modest aspiration to provide
basic health insurance benefits for seniors sixty-five years of age and older,
some citizens with disabilities, and persons with chronic kidney disease.
Its initial funding was modest as well-a mere $3.4 billion in fiscal year
1967,11 or 2.15 percent of the $158.3 billion federal budget. 12  The
perception of the American Medical Association and others, however, was
that Medicare was the first, immodest step toward the socialization of
American medicine. Thus, part of the political compromise that was
necessary to overcome the opposition of the American Medical Association
is embodied in the first section of the Medicare law:
10. The Medicare Act, an insurance program that provides health care benefits
primarily for those over 65 years of age and the disabled, and the Medicaid Act, an
entitlement program that provides health care benefits for those who qualify on the basis of
financial need, were both enacted in 1965. See Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965). In
certain instances, the Medicare and Medicaid programs each produced the effect described
in this essay, as for example when certain conduct on the part of the provider was made a
condition of participation in both programs. I have not parsed the effects of the two
programs in this essay, however, because (1) my main focus is on Medicare, (2)
distinguishing between the two is not very illuminating when both programs produced the
same effect, and (3) it is easier to discuss the impact of Medicare alone without the added
(and mostly unnecessary) burden of separating Medicare effects from Medicaid effects in
the text.
11. See U.S. HOUSE COMMITrEE ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG., IST SESS.,
MEDICARE & HEALTH CARE CHARTBOOK 82 (Comm. Print 1997) (hereinafter MEDICARE
CHARTBOOK).
12. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMEs TO 1970 at 1105, Series Y 339-342 (1975)
(hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS).
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control
over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical
services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation
of any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person
providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control
over the administration or operation of any such institution, agency,
or person. 13
There is probably no physician or patient in the country who believes
this promise has been kept. Moreover, as the following sections show,
what Medicare has wrought is nothing less than a revolution in the way
health care (and along the way, health law) is experienced and understood
some thirty-five years after its inception.
I. "HE WHO PA YS THE PIPER... "
One of the keys to understanding the impact of the Medicare program
on health law is to see the impact of the program on health care
expenditures. In 1995 constant dollars, the Medicare program's total
outlays have gone from $13.8 billion in fiscal year 196714 (or 2.15 percent
of total federal outlays 5) to $180.1 billion in fiscal year 199516 (or 11.88
percent of total federal outlays' 7). It now ranks as the fourth largest federal
program (behind only Social Security, defense, and interest on the national
debt).' 8
The growth in Medicare expenditures tracks the overall growth in
federal health spending, which in 1960 (before the enactment of the
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994). Although proposals for government-sponsored health
insurance in the 20th century date back at least to 1918, political realities made Medicare a
possibility only once the Democrats captured both houses of Congress and the Presidency in
1961. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE PoLmcS OF MEDICARE 5-39 (1970). As proposed in
1961, Medicare would have covered hospital and nursing-home-but not surgical-
expenses, a considerable watering down of previous proposals for universal health
insurance. Id. at 39. Even a program of such modest goals had to be sold very carefully to
the American public and the medical profession. President Kennedy was clear that "[t]he
program is not socialized medicine.... It is a program of prepayment for health costs with
absolute freedom of choice guaranteed. Every person will choose his own doctor and
hospital." Id. at 40. The importance of this guarantee four years later, when the Medicare
legislation was signed into law, is reflected in § 1395.
14. See MEDICARE CHARTBOOK, supra note 11, at 86.
15. See supra text accompanying note 12.
16. See MEDICARE CHARTBOOK. supra note 11, at 86.
17. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1999 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 348, Table No. 542 (2000) (hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT).
18. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN L. REv. 39, 40 (1999).
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Medicare and Medicaid programs) was 3.3 percent of all federal
expenditures and by 1995 had grown to 20.0 percent.'9 Similarly, our total
health expenditures (from all public and private sources) as a percentage of
gross domestic product increased from 5.1 percent to 13.7 percent over the
same period; much of that 269 percent increase was obviously fueled by
the 548 percent increase in federal outlays for health care.
As has been commonly observed for a number of years,2" the size of
the health care economy, measured as a percentage of gross domestic
product, represents the largest single sector of the national economy and
exceeds defense and education combined. 21 Fully 22 percent of the health
care economy is paid with Medicare dollars.22
One of the significant social consequences of the federal programs has
been a growth in per capita spending on health care that not only exceeds
other developed countries but also is increasing at a rate that has the United
States pulling away from the pack.23 Over the past thirty years, Americans
have developed an increasing appetite for health care goods and services,
one that has been fueled by government payment programs and satisfied by
a steadily growing health care economy.
Moreover, most hospitals and many physicians are even more
dependent upon Medicare revenue than these numbers would suggest. This
is so because, compared to persons under the age of sixty-five, Medicare
beneficiaries see their physicians more often, are hospitalized more
frequently, and experience longer average lengths of stay in hospitals.24 As
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvIcEs, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1999, at
283 (1999) (hereinafter HEALTH 1999).
20. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM 24 (1992).
21. For 1997 (the most year for which there are data in all relevant categories), the
percentages are 3.4% for defense, see 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 17, at 888,
Table No. 1444; 7.0% for education, see id. at 163, Table No. 254; and 13.5% for health,
see HEALTH 1999, supra note 19, at 283, Table No. 115.
22. See BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
STOLZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. ScHwARTz, HEALTH LAW 537 (2d ed. 2000).
23. Per capita spending on health care in the United States in 1960 was about twice as
high as in Great Britain, nearly 40% higher than in Canada, about 55% higher than in
Germany, and more than five times higher than in Japan. By 1994, the United States'
spending was nearly three times higher than in Great Britain, about 75% higher than in
Canada, and nearly twice that of Germany. Only Japan's level of per capita expenditures
grew at a faster rate than the United States'-perhaps reflecting its low level of health care
spending in 1960 and the robust performance of its economy after World War II-but our
level of spending was still about 250% higher than Japan's. See MEDICARE CHARTBOOK,
supra note 11, at 12, Table 1.6.
24. See 1999 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 17, at 134, Table No. 199 (Visits to
Office Based Physicians), and at 138, Table No. 207 (Hospital Utilization Rates: 1980 to
1996)).
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a result, federal spending (of which Medicare and Medicaid are the largest
parts) accounted in 1995 for more than half of hospital revenues25 and more
than twenty-five percent of physician revenues.26
II. "... CALLS THE TUN'
The steady growth of the federal budget for health care goods and
services, and the corresponding dependence of hospitals and physicians on
federal dollars, has given the federal government enormous leverage in its
dealings with health care providers. The Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), which administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs
through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), has used its
leverage to be a more prudent purchaser of goods and services, especially
in the last fifteen years. In addition, Congress has been able to impose
reforms on the health care industry by exercising its Taxing and Spending
Clausez powers to make compliance with those reforms part of the terms
and conditions of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Some of the major changes brought about by Congress' twin roles-
informed purchaser and industry reformer-are described in the remainder
of this section.
A. Universal Single-Payer Health Care Insurance (for Seniors)
Despite the demise of the Clinton health care reform plan in the early
1990's, and against the backdrop of continued pleas for and against a
single-payer system for the United States, Congress has effectively placed
most senior citizens into a single-payer system, at least with respect to the
benefits covered by Medicare. Congress accomplished this by tinkering
with its initial promise not to interfere with beneficiaries' freedom of
25. See MEDICARE CHARTBOOK, supra note 11, at 20, Table 1.10.
26. Id. at 26, Table 1.13.
27. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Unlike the Commerce Clause, id. cl.3, which has
recently suffered a few setbacks, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000)
(Congress lacks authority under Commerce Clause to enact civil remedy provisions in the
Violence Against Women Act), the Taxing and Spending Clause continues to be a robust, if
not quite unlimited, source of legislative power. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992) (even though Congress may not directly compel state legislative or
regulatory action, it may induce that action by placing conditions on the receipt of federal
funds); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (condition must relate to the
purpose behind the expenditure of federal money); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (conditions must be expressly stated). Presumably
Congress' ability to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds by private entities is
even less constrained. Cf Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589, 590 (1937)
(emphasizing that a private entity, not a state, was the challenging party).
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choice of provider.28 In 1997 Congress amended the Medicare statute and
effectively prevented most physicians from entering into private contracts
with most Medicare beneficiaries for most, if not all, covered services.29
The result is that physicians and their patients must look to the Medicare
program for payment for services that are covered by the program and may
not arrange for payment outside the system. Thus, within the ambit of
services covered by Medicare, Congress has created a single-payer system
and has locked into that system the seniors who are the direct beneficiaries
of the program and their children and other potential heirs who are (to the
same extent) relieved of the financial burden of paying for health care for
those seniors. It will be interesting to see what effect Congress' gambit of
locking beneficiaries and their physicians into the program will have on the
political dynamics of the program in the years ahead.
B. Challenging the Culture of Hospitals and their Medical Staffs
In response to high inflation in the hospital industry, a mushrooming
Medicare budget, a growing federal budget deficit, and initiatives by the
Reagan Administration, Congress in 1983 changed the way hospitals were
paid for in-patient services from a cost-based system to a prospective
payment system (PPS)." Under PPS, in-patient services are paid in an
amount that is established in advance. Although some provision is made to
reimburse hospitals for very expensive "outliers," a certain amount of
variation in costs is expected from patient to patient, but the amount
Medicare pays remains fixed.31 The idea behind PPS32 is that it creates an
28. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29. Congress did not actually prohibit private contracts, but the conditions it imposed
are so onerous, most physicians simply cannot afford to use them. If a physician chooses to
enter into a private contract with a Medicare beneficiary, the physician must at the same
time promise not to bill the Medicare program for any services provided to any Medicare
beneficiary (not just the beneficiary on the other side of the private contract) for a period of
two years. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1997). If the physician nonetheless
"knowingly and willfully" breaches the promise and submits a claim during the two-year
period, the physician may accept no payments of any kind for any services provided to any
Medicare beneficiaries for the remainder of the two years. See id. § 1395a(b)(3)(C).
30. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601(c)(1), 97 Stat. 65
(1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1994)). The history and impact of
PPS are reviewed in Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare
Prospective Payment System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources
Under a Government Health Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151, 1158-71 (1986).
31. See e.g. Kinney, supra note 30 at 1176.
32. There appears to have been not one idea, but many, behind the adoption of PPS,
and the rationales and goals, argues Professor David Frankford, were somewhat
contradictory and incomplete. See David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency
and Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (1993).
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incentive for hospitals to provide more efficient, cost-effective care,
because they are penalized financially when costs exceed the PPS payment
and are rewarded when their costs fall below the PPS payment. One of the
problems that PPS apparently did not anticipate and has not solved is that
hospitals, who have good reason to economize on patient care, do not have
direct control over the physician-centered decision making process that
largely determines the utilization of resources for patient care. Moreover,
Medicare's payment methodology for physicians has remained essentially
fee-for-service, so that the system's financial incentives for physicians run
against its financial incentives for hospitals.
The tension between hospital administrators and physicians over
"practice styles" and patient decision making was not created by Medicare.
The "corporatization" of hospital management, the disappearance of the
charitable immunity doctrine, and the hospitals' increased legal exposure
under theories of vicarious liability and corporate negligence have all
contributed to a climate in which hospitals jockey with medical staffs for
de facto control of the medical care provided within their walls.
Medicare's shift to PPS, however, has added financial concerns to what had
already become a difficult political situation.
C. New Technologies
HCFA is prohibited from paying for items or services that "are not
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury
or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." 3 3 One way
HCFA can carry out its obligations under this provision of law is by
making "national coverage decisions," which grant, limit, or exclude
Medicare coverage for specific medical services, procedures, and devices.34
The impact of this activity on access to health care goods and services is
obvious and immediate and has the potential to slow down the
dissemination of new technologies, although national coverage denials are
far outnumbered by local coverage determinations. 35 National coverage
determinations have a second effect, as well: "When a manufacturer
considers bringing a new drug, medical device, or biologic to market, two
fundamental questions are who will use it and who will pay for it." 36 For
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (1994).
34. This process is described in Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg.
31124 (2000) (notice of intent to publish a proposed rule).
35. See FuRRow ET AL, supra note 22, at 546.
36. John B. Reiss, Commentary on Payment and Reimbursement Issues Affecting the
Marketing of Drugs, Medical Devices, and Biologics, with Emphasis on the Anti-Kickback
Statute andStark II, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 99, 99 (1997).
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drugs and devices that "will be used primarily by the aged population, the
major concern is Medicare's coverage and payment regulations[,]...
which tend to set the standard for other payors." 37 National coverage
decisions, therefore, have the potential to affect manufacturers' decisions
about bringing new products to market and even where to invest their
research-and-development dollars.38
D. Restructuring the Industry
As a smart purchaser of health care goods and services, HCFA has a
strong interest in not getting ripped off. Even a small percentage of waste
or fraud, multiplied times the huge Medicare budget, can be billions and
billions of dollars-after a while, as Everett Dirksen was fond of saying,
you could be talking about real money.39 Congress has attempted to deal
with fraud and abuse of the Medicare program through legislation that has
been implemented by HCFA and by DHHS' Office of Inspector General
(OIG). Much of the anti-fraud legislation deals with garden-variety
fraud-e.g., billing for services that were not rendered, double-billing for
services that were, misdescribing the services rendered in order to increase
reimbursements. 0
Two other provisions, however, do not address ordinary fraud at all.
The first, commonly known as the anti-kickback law, prohibits the payment
(or offer) or receipt (or solicitation) of "any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind" in return for (or to induce) the referral of a patient (or the
ordering, leasing, purchasing, etc. of goods, facilities, services, etc.) and for
which the Medicare (or Medicaid) program may pay.4' The second
provision, usually referred to as Stark II (in honor of its sponsor,
Representative Pete Stark), broadly prohibits self-referrals by physicians-
that is, referrals to entities in which the physician has an investment interest
37. Id.
38. See generally David M. Frankford, Food Allergy and the Health Care Financing
Administration: A Story of Rage, I Win. L. SYMP. J. 159 (1996); Richard A. Rettig,
Artificial Kidneys and Artificial Hearts, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1991); Note, Reimbursing
New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1095 (1992).
39. RESPECTULLY QUOTED 155 (Suzy Platt, ed. 1989) (attributing quotation to Sen.
Dirksen but noting its absence from formal addresses and papers of the senator).
40. These types of activities and others like them are addressed in 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1320a-7 (providing for exclusion from the program for prohibited acts), 1320a-7a (civil
monetary penalties), 1320a-7b (criminal penalties), 1320a-7c to 7e (providing for elements
of fraud and abuse control program, advisory opinions and fraud alerts, and fraud and abuse
data collection program) (West Supp. 2000).
41. Id. § 1320a-7b(b).
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or a compensation arrangement.42
Both of these laws are aimed at program "abuse" (conduct that may
create an incentive to provide unnecessary goods or services), and both
laws also arguably promote patient autonomy, by making referrals more a
matter of patient choice than one of barter in the marketplace.43 Both laws
are also arguably over-inclusive and a hindrance to the development of a
rational, efficient marketplace for health care goods and services. 44 This is
not the Essay for a resolution of this debate. What should be noted,
however, and what is not even fairly debatable, are the wide-ranging effects
both laws have had upon the organization and financing of health care
providers and upon the development of a health-law specialty within the
bar.
The breadth of the fraud and abuse provisions is truly impressive.
Every lease of equipment or office space between a health care provider
and potential source of referrals, every medical directorship, every
physician group practice, every new financing arrangement, every contract
with a billing and collecting firm, every ambulance restocking agreement,
every training program, and many other arrangements too numerous to list
here requires a consideration of these laws. Often, deals must be
restructured, and occasionally they must be abandoned, because of these
laws. Their requirements and prohibitions have literally remade the face of
the health care industry, since compliance with Medicare fraud and abuse
laws is not optional for most physicians, hospitals, home health agencies,
nursing homes, and other providers of health care goods and services. The
net effect of these changes may be good or bad, but they are real. Those
effects will not disappear overnight, even if the federal fraud and abuse
laws were repealed, because many states have enacted their own versions
of the kickback and the self-referral prohibitions. 45
The scope and complexity of the statutes and their application to
health care providers have spawned dozens of safe harbors,46 advisory
42. Id. § 1395nn.
43. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon Davies, The Fraud and Abuse Statute:
Rationalizing or Rationalization?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 129 (Winter 1996).
44. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute, id. at
118.
45. See THOMAS WM. MAYO, NAT'L HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, STATE ILLEGAL-
REMUNERATION AND SELF-REFERRAL LAWS (1996) (monograph on file with author).
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1999). See also Ambulance Restocking Safe Harbor
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 65 Fed. Reg. 32060 (2000) (notice of proposed
rulemaking); Civil Money Penalty Safe Harbor to Protect Payment of Medicare
Supplemental Insurance and Medigap Premiums for ESRD Beneficiaries, 65 Fed. Reg.
25460 (2000) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor
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opinions,47 fraud alerts,4" and "special fraud alerts," "Medicare advisory
bulletins," and "special advisory bulletins," 49 not to mention numerous
other forms of explanation, warning, and clarification. Any regulatory
scheme that attempted to create a payment system for such a complex
human activity as health care is going to replicate that complexity in its
own rules. Any health care provider who tries to navigate these waters
without the assistance of competent health care counsel, or at least a
sophisticated compliance advisor, runs a substantial risk of a costly
misstep-and thus was the health law consulting industry born. Beyond
advising clients on compliance matters, the health law bar brings and
defends against False Claims Act suits by qui tam relators, 0 writes and
enforces state and federal regulations, and performs the myriad of functions
required by any thoroughly regulated industry. Without the massively
complex Medicare and Medicaid statutes and their regulatory kin, health
law would likely be a mostly administrative-law practice that revolved
around licensure issues, with the occasional risk management, corporate
governance, tax compliance, or antitrust question thrown in for some
variety.
Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-
Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518 (1999) (final rule); Statutory Exception to the Anti-
Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. 63504 (1999) (interim final
rule with request for comment). Although not technically a "safe harbor" rule, the Stark I
regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350-.361 (1999), and the proposed Stark II rule, Physicians'
Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed.
Reg. 1659 (1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. parts 411, 424, 435, and 455), accomplish
somewhat the same purpose. The Stark law contains far more (and more explicit)
exceptions than does the anti-kickback statute, which contains very broad and general
prohibitions and directs DHHS to carve out exceptions through the safe-harbor process. For
all of its detail, however, the Stark law desperately needs the explanations and clarifications
of a legislative rule.
47. The OIG collected its 42 advisory opinions. See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., Advisory Opinions, (last modified June 12, 2000)
<http:l/www.hbs.gov/progorgloigladvopn/index.htm>.
48. Fraud alerts were issued in 1996 and 1997 to identify fraudulent scams or schemes
that may produce significant dollar losses to the Medicare program or that may pose a threat
to patient health or safety. They are collected on the HCFA's web site. See Health Care
Financing Administration, Listing of Medicare Fraud Alerts, (last modified Feb. 23, 1998)
<http:lwww.hcfa.gov/medicare/fraudUMFA2.HTM>.
49. These advisories are directed to beneficiaries and providers alike, are primarily
intended to heighten awareness of basic fraud and abuse principles, and often include
contact information if the reader has knowledge of apparent fraud or abuse. They are
collected on the OIG's web site, Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Special Fraud Alerts, Medicare Advisory Bulletins and Special Advisory Bulletins
(last modified Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.hhs.gov/progorgloiglfrdalrtlindex.htm>, and are
published in the Federal Register.
50. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
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E. Reforming the Industry
In order to be eligible Medicare payments, hospitals, physicians, and
various other health care providers must file provider agreements with
DHHS51 and meet certain other "conditions of participation." 5 2 Many of
the elements of these provider agreements are just what one would expect:
providers promise to charge only amounts permitted by law, to engage in
peer review, to inform Medicare beneficiaries of their rights under the
program, and the like. In addition to these strictly program-related items,
Congress has leveraged the industry's reliance on federal dollars to
encourage behaviors that are often unrelated to the Medicare program at
all. The technique is well known: pursuant to its taxing and spending
powers, Congress can attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds as
long as the conditions are stated explicitly and there is some minimal
relationship between the object of the expenditure and the condition
established by Congress. 3 By attaching conditions to the receipt of
Medicare funds, Congress has been able to influence provider behaviors
beyond what was strictly necessary to accomplish the goals of the Medicare
program and to extend its influence into disparate areas of health law.
Consider these examples:
1. Anti-dumping
The provider agreement obligates hospitals to comply with the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act54 (EMTALA), often
referred to as the "anti-dumping law."55 This law obligates hospitals to
provide a medically appropriate screening of any person who comes to the
emergency department 6 and, if the person has an emergency medical
condition, to stabilize the medical condition (within the hospital's ability to
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc (West. Supp. 2000).
52. As used in this Essay, "conditions of participation," which apply to hospitals paid
under Part A of the Medicare statute, also include "conditions of coverage," which are
applicable to various providers paid pursuant to Part B of the statute. See generally
FuRRow ET AL., supra note 22, at 550-5 1.
53. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
55. Actually, the provider agreement is somewhat redundant, since hospitals are
obligated to comply with EMTALA, which was enacted in 1986 as an amendment to the
Medicare statute, whether or not they are participating hospitals. Compare id. § 1395dd(a)-
(c) (describing obligations of" hospital") with id. §§ 1395dd(d) (subjecting a "participating
hospital" that violates EMTALA to civil money penalties) & 1395dd(e)(2) (defining
"participating hospital" as one that has executed a provider agreement pursuant to id. §
1395cc).
56. Id. § 1395dd(a).
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do so) or to transfer the patient to an appropriate facility.57 EMTALA is a
salutary attempt to eliminate the scandalous practice of" dumping" patients
who could not pay for their care on public hospitals, sometimes delaying
the life- or limb-saving treatment necessary to meet the patient's medical
needs.5 8 It is not limited, however, to Medicare beneficiaries who come to
the hospital's emergency department; the hospital's duties extend to any
person regardless of that person's status as a Medicare beneficiary. 9 In
one well-known case, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that EMTALA extends to an anencephalic infant
who repeatedly came to a Virginia hospital's emergency room in
respiratory distress.60
2. Organ donation
Because of a critical shortage of organs for transplant, thousands of
organ transplant candidates die each year while waiting for an organ.61 To
help increase the rate of organ donation, one of the Medicare conditions of
participation for hospitals requires hospitals to inform the local organ
procurement organization when a patient's death is imminent or has
occurred and to "[e]nsure... that the family of each potential donor is
informed of its options to donate organs, tissues, or eyes or to decline to
donate." 62
3. Advance directives
All fifty states recognize, by statute or by court decision, "living
wills," and many states recognize medical powers of attorney, out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate orders, and other directives for advance end-of-
life decision making. In 1990, Congress enacted the Patient Self-
Determination Act,63 which required hospitals and other institutional health
care providers to inform patients of their rights under state law, and to
57. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1). The transfer itself must satisfy certain detailed requirements
and must be "appropriate." Id § 1395dd(c).
58. See Brian E. Kamoie, EMTALA: Reaching Beyond the Emergency Room to Expand
Hospital Liability, 33 J. Hosp. L. 25, 26 (Winter 2000).
59. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1) (1994).
60. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825 (1994).
61. See INsTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION 61-82
(1999).
62. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(3) (1999).
63. The Patient Self-Determination Act was introduced as S. 1766, 10 1st Cong. (1989)
and eventually enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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formulate institutional policies for dealing with advance directives. 64
Compliance with the Patient Self-Determination Act is included in the
provider agreement signed by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing
facilities, home health agencies, and hospices.6"
4. Patients' Rights
A hospital condition of participation requires, hospitals to inform all
patients of their rights, and to protect the exercise of those rights, with
respect to grievance procedures, privacy and safety, confidentiality,
participation in medical decision making, and the use of restraints.66
F. "Spillover" effect on other agencies
A last example of the pervasive impact of the Medicare program upon
health law involves the Internal Revenue Service's approval of tax-exempt
health care entities. In February 1999, word got out that the IRS had issued
an unpublished private letter ruling approving two exempt hospitals'
gainsharing activities.67 "Gainsharing" occurs when an entity, such as a
hospital, rewards physicians or physician groups for delivering cost-
effective care by sharing the savings with the physicians. If the hospital is
tax-exempt, it was feared that such an arrangement might constitute excess
private benefit or inurement (payment of a benefit to an insider), which
could result in monetary penalties or loss of the hospital's tax-exempt
status. The IRS, however, ruled that under the right circumstances and
with appropriate safeguards, gainsharing was not a threat to the hospitals'
tax-exempt status.
Then in July 1999, in a "special advisory bulletin" that also addressed
gainsharing,8 the OIG concluded that gainsharing programs violate the
Medicare statute's prohibition against hospital payments that induce
physicians to reduce or limit clinical services to patients69 and may violate
the anti-kickback statute' as well. The IRS' informal response to the
OIG's special advisory bulletin suggested that the tax agency would be
64. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1) (1994).
65. See id. § 1395cc(a)(1)(Q); 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(b)(I)-(3), 489.100-.104 (1999).
66. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13 (1999).
67. IRS Approves Gainsharing Programs in Two Unreleased Private Letter Rulings, 8
Health Law Rep. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 25, 1999).
68. Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements
and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to
Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37985 (1999) (notice).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (1994).
70. See id. § 1320a-7b(b).
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reluctant to approve gainsharing proposals,71 at least without first running
the proposal past the 0IG first.72
All told, these examples show just how pervasive the influence of the
Medicare program has been, not only with respect to the legal rules that
determine the cost, quality, and level of access to care enjoyed by Medicare
beneficiaries, but with respect to the care enjoyed by non-Medicare
beneficiaries and even the wholly distinct legal rules administered by a
different federal agency.
CONCLUSION
When Volume 1 of the Syracuse Law Review appeared in 1949, it
initiated what has proved to be a fifty-year (and counting) tradition of
excellence. That volume included lead articles by distinguished faculty
(Professors Kharas and Miller), legal scholars from other institutions
(Julius Cohen, Jerome Frank, and Roscoe Pound), and a couple of
government officials (almost-Supreme Court Associate Justice (and Fourth
Circuit Judge) John J. Parker and the uninitialed John Edgar Hoover).
Judge Alexander Holtzoff of the District Court for the District of Columbia
wrote on the thoroughly modem topic (then and now) of fair trial vs. free
press.73 Charles Alan Wright, still only a law clerk to Judge Charles E.
Clark, co-authored with his judge what may have been his first lead article
in a law review;74 then, as always, Mr. Wright's prose was tight and his
opinions unvarnished .7  This was the same year that President Truman
urged Congress to enact a national health insurance plan that would be
administered by a single federal agency, that would provide for health
insurance for the poor through federal grants to the states, that would
guarantee freedom of choice of provider, and that would reimburse
physicians on either a fee-for-service, capitated, or salary basis, as
determined by a majority of practitioners in the individual health service
71. Government Officials Discuss Gainsharing, IRS 'Reluctant' to Issue Favorable
Rulings, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1301 (Aug. 5, 1999).
72. Gainsharing Rulings Requests Sent to IRS Will Likely be Sent to HHS OIG, 8
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1776 (Nov. 4, 1999).
73. Alexander Holtzoff, The Relation Between the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right
of Freedom of the Press, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 369 (1950).
74. Charles E. Clark & Charles Alan Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-
Making Power: A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 346 (1950).
75. It's an interesting twist of fate that placed Judge Holtzoff and Charles Alan Wright
in the inaugural volume. Holtzoff was co-editor of West Publishing's magnum opus,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (Barron & Holtzoff, eds.), which Professor Wright would
begin revising as co-editor in 1960 and which would be succeeded by a completely new
edition by Professor Wright (with Arthur Miller and eventually others) a decade later.
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areas.7 6 Medicare may have been the most important development to hit
health law in fifty years, but a look back to 1949 and through the pages of
the first volume of this law review shows that some things haven't changed
all that much.
Congratulation to the College of Law and the Syracuse Law Review
on fifty years of vigorous, helpful legal scholarship and best wishes from a
loyal son of Syracuse for another distinguished half-century!
76. See MARMOR, supra note 13, at 11-12.
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